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Abstract 
We examine the impact of board structure on executive pay for 1,880 UK public firms over 
1983-2002, using panel data analysis. Firstly, the proportion of non-executive directors tends 
to decrease the rate of increase in executive pay whilst board size tends to increase it. 
Secondly, the proportion of non-executives strengthens the relation between the rate of 
increase in executive pay and changes in performance. In particular, although for firms in 
general the pay-performance link is much weaker when performance is poor, a higher 
proportion of non-executives strengthens this link considerably. Finally, firms that increase 
the number of non-executives in order to comply with the Cadbury Code of 1992, experience 
both a decline in the rate of increase in executive pay and an increase in pay-performance 
sensitivity. 
 
JEL classification: G32, G34 
Keywords: Executive pay; Board size; Board composition; UK; Cadbury  
 2
1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the growth in executive pay levels and the perceived lack of its 
link to firm performance has received significant attention. It is the board of directors’ 
responsibility for setting executive pay, and their perceived inability to do so effectively has 
been one of the drivers for corporate governance reforms around the world, along with other 
perceived failures resulting in corporate scandals and failures. Such reforms have included 
demands for smaller boards with a higher proportion of independent directors, the belief 
being that such boards will be more effective at monitoring tasks which include limiting 
excessive pay awards and providing a stronger pay-performance link.  
Despite the importance of this issue, there is only limited empirical evidence relating 
executive pay to board structure. The small number of previous studies nearly all use US data, 
employ relatively small selective samples and use a cross-sectional econometric approach. 
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the impact of board structure on 
executive cash compensation in the UK. In contrast to previous studies, we employ a very 
large comprehensive panel dataset of some 1,880 firms over a long time period, 1983-2002. 
Our results should therefore be more robust to sample selection and time period bias. 
Providing evidence from outside the US is of interest to see whether and how the relation 
between board structure and pay differs in a different setting, with a different legal and 
institutional environment. Although the UK corporate governance system has many 
similarities to that of the US, there are notable differences (discussed in Section 3 below) 
which may undermine the monitoring role of non-executive directors.  
We find evidence that non-executive directors play an important monitoring role in 
shaping both the rate of increase in executive pay levels and the relation between the rate of 
increase in executive pay levels and changes in performance. Firstly, the proportion of non-
executives tends to decrease the rate of increase in executive pay levels whilst board size 
tends to increase it. Secondly, the proportion of non-executives strengthens the relation 
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between the rate of increase in executive pay levels and changes in performance. We find 
evidence of an asymmetric pay-performance sensitivity for all firms, whereby when 
performance is poor, the pay-performance link is much weaker than when performance is 
strong. However, a higher proportion of non-executives strengthens the link between pay and 
performance when performance is poor. In contrast, board size has little impact on the pay-
performance link.  
Analysis of the UK over the sample time period allows us to address the impact of the 
Cadbury Report (1992) on executive pay. This corporate governance reform (described in 
Section 3 below), motivated by perceived corporate governance failures including excessive 
pay levels, recommended that all listed firms should (among other things) have at least three 
non-executive directors. Adoption of the recommendations was on a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis. Previous studies have found that adoption of Cadbury leads to a stronger link between 
firm underperformance and CEO dismissal (Dahya et al., 2002), a greater likelihood of 
appointing an outside CEO (Dahya et al., 2005), and better overall performance (Dahya and 
McConnell, 2007). Our results add to this literature by showing that adopting firms also 
experience a lower rate of increase in executive pay levels and an increase in pay-
performance sensitivity.  
Our long sample period allows us to address problems of endogeneity. Firstly, we employ 
panel data fixed effects methods that control for the possibility that both board structure and 
executive pay are determined by some unobservable firm specific variable. Secondly, our 
analysis of the Cadbury Reforms can to some extent address the concern that board structure 
and executive pay are jointly determined by one another. 1 To the extent that board structure 
changes following Cadbury can be attributed to Cadbury then they are exogenous (Dahya et 
al., 2002; and Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). However, it is important to note that since 
the Cadbury recommendations were not compulsory, Cadbury is not a strictly exogenous 
event, unlike Sarbanes-Oxley which was compulsory by US law.   
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the literature on board 
structure and executive pay. Section 3 describes aspects of board structure and executive pay 
in the specific UK context. Section 4 describes the methodology and data. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.   
2. Board Structure and Executive Pay: Literature Review 
One of the primary functions of boards of directors is to monitor managers, which includes 
setting executive pay. As Jensen and Murphy (2004, p. 50) note; “A primary role of boards of 
directors is to hire, fire, and set the remuneration of the CEO and other top executives”. 
Principal-agent theory shows how pay should be determined by performance in a way that 
ensures managers pursue the interests of shareholders (Murphy, 1999). However, there is a 
general perception that executive pay is often too high, whilst the large empirical literature 
shows that the pay-performance relationship is small and weak (Murphy, 1999). It has 
therefore been argued that executive pay is possibly a symptom of the principal agent 
problem rather than being an answer to it, and is manipulated by CEOs who are monitored 
ineffectively by their boards (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Two characteristics of boards that 
are argued to be of crucial importance in providing the monitoring function and in setting 
effective executive pay, are the proportion of non-executive directors and board size.   
The proportion of non-executive directors on the board is argued to have a restraining 
impact on pay levels and a positive impact on the pay-performance link. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that compensation decisions should be carried out by non-executive directors, 
who are more likely to be independent of the CEO and objective when it comes to evaluating 
the CEOs performance. Also, non-executive directors often already have experience in 
monitoring top management and may wish to signal their ability to other firms that may 
subsequently employ them as non-executives. In contrast, “insider-dominated boards imply 
problematic self monitoring, and particularly weak monitoring of the CEO, since the CEO is 
likely to be in a position to influence the insider directors career advancement within the 
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firm” (Zajac and Westphal, 1994, p. 125). Recent regulation is in line with these arguments. 
Stock exchange regulation changes made following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 requires US 
listed firms to have a majority of independent directors on the board, one aim of which is to 
reduce the manager’s influence over executive pay.  
The impartiality and objectiveness of non-executive directors described above is not 
universally accepted.  Non-executive directors are frequently not independent of the CEO, 
who may have been responsible for their selection. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that 
board composition is determined by the CEO. The CEO could be friends with non-executive 
directors, and may also provide consulting work to them (Singh and Harianto, 1989). 
Furthermore, if non-executive directors are also executive directors at other companies, 
awarding high pay as non-executives can potentially result in them receiving higher pay as 
executives because of the tendency to base pay levels on levels in comparable firms. Hence 
there is a potential conflict of interests here (Main and Crystal, 1988; Ezzamel and Watson, 
2002).  
The main findings from previous empirical studies on board structure and executive 
compensation are displayed in Table 1 below. Overall, the proportion of non-executives 
appears to be positively correlated with higher executive pay. All ten previous studies find a 
positive correlation, six of which are statistically significant (Main, 1991; Main and Johnston, 
1993; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Cyert et al., 2002; Fernandes, 2008; and Ozkan, 2007), and 
four of which are insignificantly positive (Mangel and Singh, 1993; Angbazo and Narayanan, 
1997; Kren and Kerr, 1997; and Evans and Evans, 2002). Only two studies have examined 
the impact on pay-performance sensitivity. Kren and Kerr (1997) find a negative impact 
where performance is measured using share returns. However, this result is not robust, being 
of marginal statistical significance and not holding when performance is measured using 
profitability. In contrast, Conyon and Peck (1998) employ a fixed effects methodology and 
find a positive relation (using share returns). Therefore, previous findings on non-executive 
proportion and pay-performance sensitivity are mixed.  
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TABLE 1 HERE 
Smaller board size is argued to have a restraining impact on pay levels or changes and a 
positive impact on the pay-performance link. Smaller boards are expected to be more 
effective at setting executive pay than larger boards because the latter suffer from 
coordination costs and free rider problems (Yermack, 1996). For example, with larger boards 
it is more difficult to arrange meetings, reach agreement, which leads to slower and less-
efficient decision-making (Jensen 1993). Free-riding increases because the cost to an 
individual director of not carrying out his monitoring role properly decreases as board size 
increases (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest 
that as board size increases beyond a certain point, these problems outweigh the initial 
advantages from having more directors to draw on, which leads to less effective boards. 2  
The main findings from previous studies on board size and executive compensation are 
also displayed in Table 1. Overall, board size appears to have a positive impact on pay levels. 
Five of the six studies find a positive impact (Main, 1991; Angbazo and Narayanan, 1997; 
Hallock, 1997; Core et al., 1999; and Ozkan, 2007), and of these, only Angbazo and 
Narayanan (1997) do not find a significant impact. Only the study by Cyert et al. (2002) does 
not find a positive impact, although it is worth noting that this study does find a positive 
impact on the bonus element of compensation, if not the base salary. In terms of the impact of 
board size on pay-performance sensitivity, only Yermack (2006) examines this and finds that 
the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation (salary and annual bonus) to share returns is 
weaker for firms with larger boards. 
One criticism of the above studies is that board size and structure are endogenous 
variables, jointly determined by one another or by some unobservable firm characteristic 
which, in turn determine CEO compensation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). In order to 
address this problem, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) argue that examination of a 
regulatory change helps mitigate the endogeneity problem, since changes to board structure 
can be attributed to the exogenous change (see also Dahya et al., 2002). Chhaochharia and 
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Grinstein (2009) consequently use the changes made by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
associated changes to stock exchange regulations 3 to study the effect of board structure on 
CEO compensation. They find that for those firms impacted by the changes, executive pay 
decreases by 10-25%, and that the one provision of the rules that has a significant impact is 
the requirement for a majority of independent directors on the board.  
3. Board Structure and Executive Pay: The UK Context 
The UK provides an interesting environment in which to study the effect of board structure 
on executive pay. The UK corporate governance system has many similarities to that of the 
US including a common law system and unitary board structures. However, there are notable 
differences in terms of the role of non-executive directors and executive pay. 
The prescribed advisory and monitoring functions of UK non-executive directors are very 
similar to those in the US (Cadbury, 1992). However, there are several reasons why the 
monitoring function may possibly be carried out less effectively in the UK. Firstly, UK non-
executive directors are rarely held legally accountable for failing to fulfill their legal duty of 
care and loyalty, in contrast to the US where it is much easier to sue a director through a civil 
action than it is in the UK. The lower threat of legal action in the UK could result in less 
incentive to monitor (Franks et al., 2001). Secondly, UK boards have historically consisted of 
a lower proportion of non-executive directors who are less independent from management 
(e.g., Cosh and Hughes, 1987). 4 Thirdly, the financial incentives (shareholding and 
remuneration) for non-executive directors in the UK to fulfill their functions are lower (Cosh 
and Hughes, 1987; and Higgs, 2003). The relative strength of other substitute governance 
mechanisms is also stronger in the UK and this further weakens the monitoring role played by 
non-executive directors (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). For example, UK companies have less 
available takeover defences and consequently the market for corporate control should perform 
a stronger function (Short and Keasey, 1999). Additionally, British institutional investors are 
more active monitors, able to act collectively (Crespi-Cladera and Renneboog, 2003), and 
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expected to perform a stronger role because ownership concentration is higher (Short and 
Keasey, 1999).  
Consistent with this argument, UK evidence suggests that non-executives do not play a 
strong monitoring role in terms of CEO turnover (Cosh and Hughes, 1997; and Franks et al., 
2001) or in terms of improving firm performance more generally (see e.g., Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998). 5 In contrast, although the US empirical evidence, reviewed by Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003), shows no association between the proportion of non-executive 
directors and general firm performance, it does show a positive relation with regard to 
specific firm actions such as acquisitions and CEO turnover decisions. Finally, in contrast to 
US findings, UK board structure is not determined by factors associated with monitoring 
costs and benefits (Guest, 2008). 
In terms of executive pay, there are several notable differences. Firstly, Conyon and 
Murphy (2000) show that US pay levels, in terms of base salary, bonus, and long term 
incentives are much higher than in the UK. Secondly, US companies have a much higher 
proportion of bonus to total compensation, and of long term incentives to total compensation. 
Share option grants account for only 10% of pay in the UK compared to 50% in the US. 
Share option grants declined in the UK over the 1990s and, for most of the period under 
consideration were linked to base salary and so were not an independent element of salary. 
Thirdly, the level of reporting of executive pay in the UK has until recently been lower than 
in the US. Until 1997, the principal disclosure requirement demanded that firms disclose only 
the cash compensation (pay plus bonus plus benefits) of the Chairman, the highest paid 
director, and the entire board whilst information on share options or long-term incentive plans 
was not available.  
Starting in the 1990s, a series of corporate governance reforms were introduced in the UK 
that had a significant impact on board structure. The Cadbury Report in 1992 made several 
recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of non-executive directors as monitors. The 
Report was motivated by perceived corporate governance failures resulting in corporate 
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scandals, failures, and excessive pay levels which appeared unrelated to performance. 6 One 
key recommendation was that all listed firms should have at least three non-executive 
directors.7 The number of non-executive directors increased significantly following Cadbury. 
Dahya et al. (2002) report that in 1998, 62.3% of all London Stock Exchange listed 
companies had at least three non-executive directors, in contrast to only 26.7% in 1988. 
Subsequently, the Hampel Report (1998) required that at least one third of the board be non-
executives and the Higgs Report (2003) required that at least 50% be non-executives.  
With specific regard to executive pay, Cadbury did not recommend lowering pay levels or 
pay growth. The report did however recommend that directors’ pay should be determined by 
a remuneration committee, wholly or mainly comprised of non-executive directors and 
chaired by a non-executive. The Greenbury Report (1995) subsequently recommended that 
the remuneration committee should consist entirely of non-executives. The anticipation was 
that shareholder and manager interests would be aligned more closely and so link pay more 
directly to performance. However, there is little empirical evidence to support this. Conyon 
(1997) and Benito and Conyon (1999) find that the presence of a remuneration Committee 
does not have a significant effect on either pay levels or the pay-performance link. The 
Greenbury Report (1995), which focused solely on executive pay, recommended that firms 
disclose details for all elements of pay for all executive directors and hence greatly increased 
disclosure from 1997 onwards.  
It is important to note that adoption of these recommendations (Cadbury, Greenbury, 
Hampel, and Higgs), which now form part of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(2006), has not been mandatory. They were, and are, a ‘comply or explain’ recommendation.8 
4. Methodology and Data 
To test for the existence of a relationship between executive pay and board size and 
structure we build on a basic relationship between executive pay and the various determinants 
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which have been identified as important in the literature on executive pay (see e.g., Girma et 
al., 2006). This basic relationship may be written as follows:   
Pay it = β 0 + β1 Pay it-1 + β2 Size it + β3 Return it + β4 Standard deviation it 
(1)                        + β5 % Non-executives it-1 + β6 Board size it-1 + h t + f i + e it       
where Pay it is defined as the logarithm of total cash compensation (salary plus bonus plus the 
cash equivalents of any perquisites but excluding pension contributions) of the highest paid 
director in company i at time t. In using this measure of executive pay, we follow other UK 
executive pay work (see e.g., Conyon, 1997; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Girma et al., 2006, and 
Girma et al., 2007). Until 1997, this was the only widely available measure of CEO pay in the 
UK. Although it has been possible since 1997 to identify the specific components of 
compensation (such as share options) received by each board member, our econometric 
model requires two years of lagged compensation and hence any analysis involving this more 
recent data would be restricted to years 1999-2002 only. Hence for almost all our sample 
period, our pay measure is the only one available and subsequently the only measure 
employed. We expect at most a minimal bias by not examining long term incentives since 
over the sample period such incentives were not an independent element of salary and formed 
only a small part of executive compensation. 
Pay it-1 is the lagged value of variable Pay it. The impact coefficient β1 gives an estimate of 
the degree of top pay persistence. Previous studies have shown that there is significant 
persistence in top pay (Conyon, 1997; and Girma et al., 2006) and therefore prior pay needs 
to be controlled for. Size it represents the logarithm of firm sales and is our measure of 
company size. Return is the logarithm of the buy and hold share return over the 12 months 
preceding the financial year end. Standard deviation it is the standard deviation of monthly 
share returns over the 12 months preceding the financial year end. %Non-executives is the 
number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of (executive and non-
executive) directors on the board. Non-executive directors are part-time directors, whilst 
executive directors are employed full time and are involved in the day to day running of the 
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company in addition to their director's duties. Board size is the logarithm of the total number 
of (executive and non-executive) directors on the board. 9 We employ the lags of board 
structure since the components of cash compensation (base salary level and bonus policy), 
tend to be determined at the start of the financial year  (see e.g., Benito and Conyon, 1999). h 
t are year dummies employed to account for economy-wide impacts, and e it is an error term.  
f i are firm specific dummy variables. Both executive pay and board structure could be 
jointly determined by an unobservable time invariant firm specific variable, which could bias 
the relation between the two. One way to address this problem is with a fixed effects model, 
where firm specific dummy variables are included to remove all firm specific unobservable 
effects. However, the presence of the lagged dependent variable Pay it-1 in a fixed effect 
model means that the conventional fixed effects estimator is biased (Nickell, 1981).  To 
overcome this problem, we instead take first differences of equation (1) to eliminate the 
company specific fixed effects (following Anderson and Hsaio (1982)) as follows:  
∆ Pay it = β 0 + β1 ∆ Pay it-1 + β2 ∆ Size it + β3 ∆ Return it + β4 ∆ Standard deviation it 
(2)                        + β5 ∆ %Non-executives it-1 + β6 ∆ Board size it-1 + h t + e it       
where the operator ∆ on any variable X is simply current value X minus last period value (∆ 
X = X t – X t-1). By taking first differences of the natural logarithm of pay we therefore 
examine the rate of increase in pay (see e.g., Girma et al., 2006).  
Taking first differences as in equation (2) introduces an MA(1) error term, and therefore 
estimation by ordinary least squares results in biased estimates on the lagged dependent 
variable, β1 (Nickell, 1981). To avoid this problem, we use instrumental variable techniques 
to estimate ∆ Pay it-1. We estimate the model using the Arrellano and Bond (1991) generalised 
method of moments procedure, which uses lagged levels of all variables from period (t-2) 
data and earlier as valid instruments in the first differences model. This yields valid 
instrumental variable estimates in the absence of second-order serial correlation, and has been 
used by previous empirical pay studies (see e.g., Main et al., 1996; Conyon, 1997; and Girma 
et al., 2006). The validity of the instruments used is examined using the Sargan test of 
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instrument validity, and the model’s success in removing the second order serial correlation is 
examined using a test for second order serial correlation.   
The source of data for our sample of UK publicly quoted firms is Datastream, from which 
all company board and performance variables are collected. We restrict our sample to those 
Datastream firm years in which data is available on all the above variables. Three successive 
years of data are required because the regression model described in equation (2) requires two 
years of lagged data. It was therefore necessary to exclude from the Datastream population of 
UK public firms those firms lacking three continuous years of data over the period 1981-
2002. Our pay model is estimated from 1983 to 2002, but for 1983 observations we require 
data going back to 1981. We exclude financial and property companies (Datastream Level 4 
Industries 80–89), due to the specific characteristics of financial ratios in these industries. Our 
final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 1,880 companies between 1983 and 2002 for 
which we have 13,492 firm year observations. The balance of the panel is shown in Table 2 
below.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 3 below presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the regression 
analysis. All the absolute variables are converted to 2002 sterling values using the UK Retail 
Price Index, and all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to remove 
influential outliers. The average (median) proportion of non-executive directors for our 
sample is 0.43 (0.43), which is similar to previous UK studies (e.g., Cosh and Hughes, 1987) 
but much smaller than that reported for US studies. For example Linck et al. (2007) report an 
average proportion of non-executive directors of 0.66. The average (median) board size is 7 
(7), which is identical to the average board size of 7 reported by Linck et al. (2007) for a 
comprehensive US study. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Impact of board structure on changes in pay  
Column (1) of Table 4 below reports the results of estimating equation (2). The coefficient 
for the lagged rate of increase in pay is significantly positive, indicating that the rate of 
increase in pay is positively related to its lagged value. The coefficient for firm size is 
significantly positive, confirming that executive pay is positively impacted by firm size. The 
coefficient for change in share return is significantly positive, indicating that there is a 
significant link between pay and performance in the UK. The sign and magnitude of these 
estimated coefficients are in line with the previous evidence of Girma et al. (2006) for the 
UK. The coefficient for lagged pay (0.30) is larger, than that for size (0.14), which is in turn 
greater than that for performance (0.05). The latter difference indicates that, although 
performance has a positive impact on pay, firm size has a relatively larger impact. The 
coefficient for the standard deviation of share returns is significantly negative. The 
diagnostics for the instrument set are adequate since both the Sargan p-value and the 2nd order 
serial correlation p-value are insignificant (p-values of 0.46 and 0.16 respectively) 
TABLE 4 HERE 
The regression estimates show a significantly inverse association between the rate of 
increase in pay and the change in the proportion of non-executives. The coefficient is -0.12 
which is statistically significant at the one percent level. It is also economically important, 
implying that an increase in the proportion of non-executives from 0.5 to 0.75 will reduce the 
rate of increase in pay by roughly three percent. This finding stands in contrast to the previous 
studies described above, all of which find a positive relation, and it is important to understand 
why our results differ so significantly. In additional tests we find that the results clearly differ 
because of the econometric methodology employed. Previous studies do not employ a fixed 
effect model nor control for prior pay levels. When we employ an ordinary least squares 
model in levels and do not control for prior pay levels, the coefficient for the proportion of 
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non-executives is significantly positive, consistent with previous studies. When we add 
lagged pay to this regression, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. When we 
additionally include firm fixed effects, the coefficient is significantly negative. Indeed, the 
coefficient is significantly negative in the fixed effect model, even when lagged pay is 
excluded. Clearly, the methodology employed has a critical impact on the conclusion drawn.  
We believe that it is critical to control for both fixed effects and for lagged pay. The fact that 
previous board structure-pay studies do not do so means that the conclusion one draws from 
these previous studies could be a spurious one. Instead, our findings suggest that the change 
in the proportion of non-executives exerts a negative influence on the rate of increase in pay 
which is consistent with the idea that non-executives play an important monitoring role in 
restraining excessive pay growth. 
 The regression estimates show a positive and significant association between the rate of 
increase in pay and the change in board size. This is consistent with the argument that 
coordination, communication, and free riding problems restrict the board’s ability to restrain 
excessive pay awards when board size increases. This is consistent with all previous studies 
and is robust to the different regression methods described above. 
5.2 Impact of board structure on the pay-performance relation 
In order to examine the impact of board structure on the pay-performance link, we include 
interactive variables that are equal to the proportion of non-executives multiplied by the share 
return (%Non-executives it-1 * Return it), and board size multiplied by share return (Board size 
it-1 * Return it). The results are reported in Column (2) of Table 4 above. The coefficient for 
the proportion of non-executives multiplied by the share return variable is significantly 
positive at the one percent level. This indicates that an increase in the proportion of non-
executives leads to a stronger pay-performance link, and is consistent with the one previous 
UK study in this area (Conyon and Peck, 1998). The coefficient for the board size multiplied 
by share return variable is positive and marginally statistically significant at the ten percent 
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level. This latter finding runs contrary to our expectations, since it suggests that larger boards 
are associated with a stronger pay-performance link.   
We test the robustness of these results by employing additional interactive variables. 
Previous studies have shown that when estimating pay-performance sensitivities, it is 
important to control for the variance of firm share returns and firm size. Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) show that pay–performance sensitivity is higher for firms with high share 
return variance, whilst Schaefer (1998) shows that it is weaker for large firms. It is important 
to control for such factors because board size and the proportion of non-executives are 
negatively impacted by share return variance and positively impacted by firm size, 
respectively (see e.g., Linck et al., 2007). In Column (3) we report results including two 
additional interactive variables; standard deviation of share returns multiplied by share return 
(Standard deviation
 it * Return it), and firm size multiplied by share return (Size it * Return it). 
The coefficient for the former variable is significantly negative, consistent with Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999). The coefficient for the latter variable is significantly positive, suggesting 
that larger UK firms have a stronger pay-performance link, contrary to Schaefer’s (1998) 
findings for the US. In this regression, the coefficient for the proportion of non-executives 
multiplied by the share return variable is still significantly positive. However, the coefficient 
for the board size multiplied by the share return variable is now statistically insignificant. It 
appears that once we control for size and variance impacts on the pay-performance link, 
board size has no additional impact. Our results do not therefore support the argument that 
board size has a negative impact on the pay-performance relation, as found by Yermack 
(1996).  
We examine whether our results differ over different ranges of board size and proportion 
of non-executives. The results, not tabulated, show that the positive effect of changes in board 
size on the rate of increase in pay appears to hold at even very small levels of board size. 
Unlike Yermack (1996), a sizeable minority (22 percent) of our sample observations have 
board size below six (the minimum board size is three directors). The coefficient for board 
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size for this subsample is 0.072 (p-value of 0.038), which is in fact greater than the coefficient 
for the sample of firms with board size greater than or equal to six (coefficient of 0.041, p-
value of 0.026). This is consistent with Eisenberg et al. (1998) who find that a negative 
association between board size and firm performance exists even over the lowest range of 
board sizes. Similarly, the impact of board size on the pay-performance link is very similar 
for firms with board sizes less than six and those with board sizes greater than or equal to six. 
With regard to the proportion of non-executives, when this is less than the median of 0.43, the 
coefficient for change in proportion of non-executives is -0.018 and statistically insignificant. 
In contrast, when the proportion of non-executives is greater than 0.43, the coefficient is 
equal to -0.178 and significant at the one percent level. Therefore, increases in the proportion 
of non-executives are associated with greater impacts when the proportion is greater. This is 
consistent with the argument that a minority of non-executives does not have significant 
monitoring strength, regardless of whether it is a small or large minority. In terms of the pay-
performance link we find similar evidence.  When the proportion of non-executives is greater 
than the median of 0.43, the coefficient for the proportion of non-executives multiplied by the 
share return variable is 0.304. In contrast, when less than 0.43, the coefficient is half the size 
(0.169). However, both coefficients are statistically significant and the difference is not as 
pronounced as it is for the rate of increase in pay.  
5.3 Impact of board structure on the asymmetric pay-performance relation 
Garvey and Milbourn (2006) show that executive pay does not adjust symmetrically to 
good and bad performance. In particular, there is an asymmetric pay-performance sensitivity, 
whereby when performance is poor, the pay-performance link is weaker than when 
performance is strong. We examine whether this is the case for our sample firms, and if so, 
whether this asymmetric sensitivity is impacted by board size and structure. In order to 
examine this we employ two new variables instead of the continuous share return as 
previously.  Return negative
 it is equal to the logarithm of the buy and hold share return over 
the 12 months preceding the financial year end if the raw return is negative, otherwise it is set 
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equal to zero. Alternatively, Return positive
 it is equal to the logarithm of the return if the raw 
return is positive, otherwise it is zero. If there is asymmetric pay-performance sensitivity, 
then the coefficient for the negative return should be lower than that for the positive return 
variable.  
The results are shown in Column (1) of Table 5 below. The coefficients for both variables 
are positive and statistically significant. However, the coefficient for the negative return 
variable (0.03) is significantly lower than the coefficient for the positive return variable 
(0.07). The difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant at the one 
percent level, showing that pay is more responsive to performance when performance is high 
than when it is low, consistent with the US evidence of Garvey and Milbourn (2006).   
TABLE 5 HERE 
In order to examine whether the asymmetric pay-performance relation differs according to 
the proportion of non-executives and board size, we include interactive variables as in Table 
4, whereby the interaction is with the negative and positive share return variables, rather than 
the continuous share return. %Non-executives it-1 * Return negative it, is equal to the 
proportion of non-executives multiplied by the negative share return variable, whilst %Non-
executives it-1 * Return positive it, is equal to the proportion of non-executives multiplied by 
the positive share return variable. If a higher proportion of non-executives causes a stronger 
link between pay and performance when performance is poor, then the coefficient for %Non-
executives it-1 * Return negative it will be significantly positive. Analogous arguments apply to 
the interaction of board size and the negative and positive share return variables.   
The results are reported in Column (2) of Table 5. The coefficient for the proportion of 
non-executives multiplied by the negative return variable is significantly positive, thus a 
higher proportion of non-executives greatly strengthens the link between pay and 
performance when performance is poor. In contrast, the proportion of non-executives 
multiplied by the positive return variable is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the positive 
relation between pay and performance that occurs when performance is good is not impacted 
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by the proportion of non-executives. The coefficient for board size multiplied by the negative 
return variable is insignificant.  However, the coefficient for board size multiplied by the 
positive return variable is significantly positive, suggesting that larger board size leads to a 
stronger pay performance link when performance is good.  
In order to check the robustness of these findings we again allow, as in Table 4, for the 
impact of the variance of share returns and firm size on the asymmetric pay-performance 
relation. In particular, in Column (3) of Table 5 we include four additional interactive 
variables, Standard deviation it * Return negative it, Standard deviation it * Return positive it, 
Size it * Return negative it, and Size it * Return positive it.  Standard deviation it * Return 
negative it is equal to the standard deviation of share returns multiplied by the negative share 
return variable, and so on. The results show that the standard deviation of share returns 
significantly reduces the pay-performance relation for both negative and positive share 
returns. However, the firm size multiplied by negative return variable is significantly positive. 
Hence larger firms have a stronger relation between pay and performance when the latter is 
poor, compared to small firms. More importantly, once these additional influences are 
included, the proportion of non-executives still has a significantly positive effect on the pay-
performance link when performance is poor. However, board size no longer has a positive 
impact on the pay-performance link when performance is high. 10 
5.4 Impact of board structure reforms on executive pay  
In this section we examine the impact on the rate of increase in pay and pay-performance 
sensitivity of those firms that adopt the Cadbury recommendation to employ at least three 
non-executive directors. Of our sample of 1,880 firms, 1,046 have data observations both 
before and after the introduction of the Code (30/06/1993). Table 6 below provides a 
breakdown of these 1,046 firms according to whether, for the pre- and post-Cadbury period, 
they are either always in compliance (‘Always’), never in compliance (‘Never’), or in and out 
of compliance (‘Some’). The ‘Some’ category is further broken down (for the post-Cadbury 
period) according to whether, if there is compliance, it is followed by continual compliance 
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(‘Once comply - always comply’), or by non-compliance (‘Comply - then no comply’). We 
focus on those firms that change their board structure to adopt the Cadbury recommendation. 
The final row of Table 6 classifies 402 such firms as ‘Adopters’, since pre-Cadbury they are 
either never in compliance or not always in compliance, and post-Cadbury they move to 
continual compliance. The other 644 firms are referred to as ‘Non-adopters’, since they are 
either always in compliance, never in compliance, or they comply irregularly.  
TABLE 6 HERE 
We employ a dummy variable, Adopters post-Cadbury it, which is set equal to one for all 
years after which adopting firms adopt Cadbury, zero for all years prior to this. This variable 
measures the impact of Cadbury adoption on the rate of increase in pay. Secondly, we interact 
this dummy variable with the firm share return, Adopters post-Cadbury
 it * ∆ Return it, to 
examine whether the pay-performance relation is strengthened following adoption. If so, then 
the coefficient for this variable should be positive. Firstly, we examine the 402 adopters in 
isolation. The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 7 below. The coefficient for the 
post-Cadbury variable is negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficient for the post-
Cadbury variable multiplied by share return is positive and marginally significant at the ten 
percent level, providing some evidence that adopting firms increase their pay-performance 
sensitivity following Cadbury.  
TABLE 7 HERE 
The specification in Column (1) of Table 7 does not control for general changes in either 
the rate of increase in pay or the pay-performance relation following Cadbury that may affect 
all firms. To address this, we include all 1,046 firms in the regression and we include four 
additional variables. Post-Cadbury it is a dummy variable set equal to one for all financial 
years ending after Cadbury (31/06/1993), zero for all financial years prior. Post-Cadbury it * 
∆ Return
 it is an interactive variable set equal to the change in firm share return if the post-
Cadbury variable is equal to one, zero otherwise. The former variable will measure the 
overall impact of Cadbury on the rate of increase in pay whilst the latter will measure the 
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impact on pay-performance sensitivity, in both cases for all 1,046 firms. In order to control 
for the fact that adopters may have either abnormal rates of increase in pay or pay-
performance regardless of Cadbury, relative to other firms, we employ two further variables. 
Adopters i is a dummy variable set equal to one for adopters, zero otherwise. Adopters i * ∆ 
Return
 it, is an interactive variable equal to whether the firm is an adopter multiplied by the 
change in firm share return. The results are reported in Column (2) of Table 7.  
The dummy variable for adopters post-Cadbury is negative and marginally significant at 
the ten percent level, providing evidence that the rate of increase in pay of adopting firms is 
lower following Cadbury that it is beforehand. The interactive variable set equal to the change 
in share return for adopting firms in post-Cadbury years is again significantly positive, 
indicating that the pay-performance of adopting firms is higher following Cadbury than 
before Cadbury. There is no evidence that adopting firms as a whole differ from other firms 
in terms of either rates of increase in pay or pay-performance sensitivity, since the 
coefficients for both the dummy variable set equal to one for adopters and the interactive 
variable set equal to the change in share return for adopters are both statistically insignificant. 
The dummy variable set equal to one for all firms for post-Cadbury years is insignificantly 
positive. The interactive variable set equal to the change in the share return for all firms for 
post-Cadbury years is significantly negative, suggesting that Cadbury actually reduces the 
pay-performance relation. In order to examine this finding further, in Column (3) of Table 7 
we consider the impact of Cadbury on all firms without distinguishing between adopters and 
non-adopters. In this case the coefficient for post-Cadbury years is again insignificantly 
positive, whilst the coefficient for the interactive share return variable is still significantly 
negative, albeit at the ten percent level.  
In summary, the results in this section show that firms which adopt the Cadbury 
recommendation to employ at least three non-executives experience a subsequent decrease in 
the rate of increase in pay and an increase in pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that 
our earlier findings on the impact of non-executive proportion on the rate of increase in pay 
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and the pay-performance relation are less likely to be driven by endogeneity since the 
changes following Cadbury can be assumed to be exogenous to some extent. The finding is 
also consistent with Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) who show that US firms which 
complied with the stock exchange requirement (introduced following the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act) for a majority of independent directors on boards subsequently reduced executive pay 
levels. However, it is important to note that (unlike Sarbanes-Oxley in the US which was 
compulsory by law) since the Cadbury recommendations were not compulsory, Cadbury is 
not exogenous to the same extent. 11 Despite the positive change for the minority of firms that 
adopt Cadbury, our results for the overall sample show that Cadbury is associated with a 
small insignificant increase in the rate of increase in pay and a decrease in pay-performance 
sensitivity. These findings are broadly consistent with those of Girma et al. (2007), who find 
no evidence of a general stronger pay-performance link following Cadbury for all firms.    
6. Conclusions 
We examine the impact of board structure on executive cash compensation for 1,880 UK 
firms over 1983-2002. In contrast to previous studies, our comprehensive panel dataset 
should be more robust to sample selection and time period biases, and allows us to employ 
panel data methods that control for unobservable firm fixed effects and persistence in 
executive pay. We find that board size has a positive impact on the rate of increase in pay, but 
no evidence that it has a negative impact on the pay-performance link. We find that that the 
proportion of non-executives has a negative impact on the rate of increase in pay and a 
positive impact on the pay-performance link. There is evidence of an asymmetric pay-
performance sensitivity, whereby when performance is poor, the pay-performance relation is 
much smaller than when performance is strong. However, a higher proportion of non-
executives strengthens the link between pay and performance when performance is poor. 
Our results on board size provide some support for the argument that problems of poor 
communication and decision-making undermine the effectiveness of large boards, at least 
 22
with respect to the rate of increase in pay, if not the relation of pay to performance. Our 
evidence on the proportion of non-executives suggests that non-executive directors in the UK 
play an important monitoring role in shaping changes in executive pay. This lies in contrast to 
the argument that non-executive directors will not play an important monitoring role in the 
UK because of specific legal and institutional factors (Franks et al., 2001), and to previous 
UK studies which find that non-executives do not play an important monitoring role in terms 
of CEO dismissals. One possibility is that non-executive directors in the UK are more 
effective at certain monitoring tasks than others, and more effective for example, at setting 
executive pay than at dismissing poorly performing CEOs.  
We find that firms that adopt the Cadbury Code’s recommendation of having at least three 
non-executive directors subsequently experience a lower rate of increase in pay and stronger 
pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that our results are less likely to be driven by 
endogeneity problems and that corporate governance reforms can possibly improve the 
effectiveness of executive pay, a conclusion similar to that reached by recent US evidence 
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). However, it is noteworthy that this positive effect only 
applies to those firms that actually adopt the recommendation. For all firms as a whole 
following Cadbury, there is if anything a higher rate of increase in pay and a decrease in the 
relation between pay and performance.  
The corporate governance reforms of recent years, both in the UK and elsewhere in the 
world, have argued that a higher proportion of non-executives will improve corporate 
governance in a number of areas, one of which is executive pay. It is argued that a higher 
proportion of non-executives will lead to both less excessive pay growth and a stronger link 
between pay and performance. Our evidence shows that this argument has well founded 
empirical support. Given the increased importance attached to non-executive directors in the 
setting of executive pay around the world, and the adoption of reforms similar to those seen in 
the UK, our findings are of widespread relevance.  
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Table 1. Summary of studies on the effect of board structure on executive pay 
Study Year Time 
period 
Country Sample 
size 
Method Board structure 
      Board 
size 
%Non-
executives 
Panel A: Pay levels 
Main 1991 1985 UK 241 OLS + * + * 
Main & Johnston 1993 1990 UK 220 OLS n.a. + * 
Mangel & Singh 1993 1988 US 79 OLS n.a. + 
Angbazo & 
Narayanan 
1997 1989 US 97 OLS + + 
Cosh & Hughes 1997 1989-94 UK 371 OLS n.a. +* 
Hallock  1997 1992 US 773 OLS + * n.a. 
Kren & Kerr 1997 1987/1989 US 268 OLS n.a. + 
Core et al. 1999 1982-84 US 205 OLS + * n.a. 
Cyert et al. 2002 1993 US 1,648 OLS -  + * 
Evans & Evans 2002 1997 Australia 350 OLS n.a. + 
Fernandes 2008 2004 Portugal 58 OLS n.a. + * 
Ozkan 2007 2004 UK 414 OLS + * + * 
Panel B: Pay-performance sensitivity  
Yermack 1996 1984-91 US 452 OLS - * n.a. 
Kren & Kerr 1997 1987/1989 US 268 OLS n.a. - * 
Conyon & Peck 1998 1991-94 UK 94 Fixed 
effects 
n.a. + * 
 
This table reports the main findings of previous studies that examine the impact of board structure on executive 
pay levels and pay-performance sensitivity. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level or better.  
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Table 2. Sample description 
Number of  data observations per year  Number of yearly data observations per firm 
Year Data 
observations 
Percent 
of total 
 Number of yearly 
data observations 
Number of 
firms 
Percent 
of total 
1983 71 0.5  1 221 11.8 
1984 166 1.2  2 165 8.8 
1985 240 1.8  3 196 10.4 
1986 281 2.1  4 170 9.0 
1987 318 2.4  5 110 5.9 
1988 404 3.0  6 99 5.3 
1989 543 4.0  7 114 6.1 
1990 623 4.6  8 107 5.7 
1991 675 5.0  9 93 5.0 
1992 761 5.6  10 101 5.4 
1993 860 6.4  11 90 4.8 
1994 869 6.4  12 85 4.5 
1995 950 7.0  13 73 3.9 
1996 1014 7.5  14 81 4.3 
1997 1026 7.6  15 52 2.8 
1998 1009 7.5  16 37 2.0 
1999 959 7.1  17 26 1.4 
2000 939 7.0  18 30 1.6 
2001 917 6.8  19 19 1.0 
2002 867 6.4  20 11 0.6 
Total 13,492 100  Total 1,880 100 
 
This table displays the sample in terms of the number of data observations per year and the number of yearly 
data observations per firm. We start with all UK firms in the Datastream database from 1983 to 2002. We 
restrict the sample to those firms that have information on all the variables described in Table 3 below, for a 
sample year and for at least two preceding years. We further exclude all financial and real estate firms 
(Datastream Level 4 Industry groupings 80-89 inclusive).   
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis 
Variable Number  Mean Median Standard deviation 
Pay 13,492 5.38 5.31 0.74 
Size  13,492 11.72 11.60 2.00 
Return 13,492 0.01 0.05 0.48 
Standard deviation 13,492 0.11 0.10 0.07 
%Non-executives 13,492 0.43 0.43 0.15 
Board size 13,492 1.96 1.95 0.34 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the sample. Pay is the logarithm of the cash compensation (salary plus 
bonus plus the cash equivalents of any perquisites but excluding pension contributions) of the highest paid 
director. Size is the logarithm of company sales adjusted for inflation. Return is the logarithm of the buy and 
hold share return over the 12 months preceding the financial year end. Standard deviation is the standard 
deviation of monthly share returns over the 12 months preceding the financial year end. %Non-executives is the 
number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors. Board size is the logarithm of the 
total number of directors on the board. 
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Table 4. The impact of board structure on executive pay levels and pay-performance 
sensitivity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.05 b 0.05 b 0.05 
 (2.09) (2.08) (1.33) 
∆ Pay it-1 0.30 a 0.30 a 0.30 a 
 (15.56) (15.52) (15.40) 
∆ Size it 0.14 a 0.14 a 0.14 a 
 (21.48) (21.54) (21.82) 
∆ Return
 it 0.05 a -0.05 -0.01 
 (7.75) -(1.33) -(0.29) 
∆ Standard deviation
 it -0.24 a -0.24 a -0.20 a 
 -(4.40) -(4.25) -(3.58) 
∆ %Non-executives it-1 -0.12 a -0.13 a -0.12 a 
 -(3.91) -(3.93) -(3.87) 
∆ Board size
 it-1 0.07 a 0.07 a 0.07 a 
 (3.68) (3.62) (3.53) 
∆ %Non-executives it-1 * Return it  0.09 a 0.10 a 
  (2.61) (2.91) 
∆ Board size
 it-1 * Return it  0.03 c -0.01 
  (1.68) -(0.38) 
∆ Standard deviation
 it * Return it   -0.31 a 
   -(4.53) 
∆ Size it * Return it   0.01 b 
   (2.41) 
    
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sargan (p-value) 0.4558 0.4601 0.4388 
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.1640 0.1506 0.1394 
No. of observations  13,492 13,492 13,492 
 
This table reports regressions of executive pay on prior pay, board structure and various firm characteristics. The 
model is estimated using the Arrellano and Bond (1991) generalised method of moments procedure. This 
procedure uses first differences of the dependent and independent variables, and instruments the first difference 
of prior pay using levels of all variables dated it-2 and earlier. Variables are as defined in Table 3. The Sargan 
statistic tests for over-identifying restrictions, and is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of 
valid instruments. The serial correlation statistic tests the absence of second-order correlation in the residuals, 
and is asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. P-values are 
provided in parentheses. a, b and c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5. The impact of board structure on asymmetric pay-performance sensitivity  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.68 c 0.05 0.67 c 
 (1.88) (1.33) (1.89) 
∆ Pay it-1 0.31 a 0.30 a 0.30 a 
 (15.73) (15.53) (15.34) 
∆ Size it 0.14 a 0.14 a 0.14 a 
 (22.27) (21.47) (20.42) 
∆ Return negative it 0.03 b -0.03 -0.05 
 (2.41) -(0.49) -(0.63) 
∆ Return positive it 0.07 a -0.06 0.04 
 (5.87) -(0.89) (0.42) 
∆ Standard deviation it -0.27 a -0.25 a -0.18 b 
 -(4.72) -(4.45) -(2.32) 
∆ %Non-executives it-1  -0.10 b -0.10 a 
  -(2.50) -(2.60) 
∆ Board size
  it-1  0.06 a 0.06 b 
  (2.59) (2.53) 
∆ %Non-executives it-1 * Return negative it  0.16 b 0.16 b 
  (2.56) (2.50) 
∆ %Non-executives it-1 * Return positive it  0.02 0.04 
  (0.26) (0.63) 
∆ Board size it-1 * Return negative it  0.00 -0.03 
  -(0.14) -(0.95) 
∆ Board size it-1 * Return positive it  0.06 c 0.02 
  (1.95) (0.61) 
∆ Standard deviation it * Return negative it   -0.24 c 
   -(1.83) 
∆ Standard deviation it * Return positive it   -0.36 a 
   -(2.73) 
∆ Size it * Return negative it   0.01 c 
   (1.89) 
∆ Size it * Return positive it   0.00 
   (0.35) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sargan (p-value) 0.4727 0.4213 0.3999 
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.1629 0.1483 0.1469 
No. of observations  13,492 13,492 13,492 
 
This table reports regressions of executive pay on prior pay, board structure and various firm characteristics. The 
model is estimated using the Arrellano and Bond (1991) generalised method of moments procedure. This 
procedure uses first differences of the dependent and independent variables, and instruments the first difference 
of prior pay using levels of all variables dated it-2 and earlier. Return negative is equal to the logarithm of the 
buy and hold share return over the 12 months preceding the financial year end if the return is negative, otherwise 
it is set equal to zero. Return positive is equal to the logarithm of the buy and hold share return over the 12 
months preceding the financial year end if the return is positive, otherwise it is set equal to zero. Other variables 
are as defined in Table 3. The Sargan statistic tests for over-identifying restrictions, and is asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The serial correlation statistic tests the absence of 
second-order correlation in the residuals, and is asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation. P-values are provided in parentheses. a, b and c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6. Classification of firms according to whether or not they adopt Cadbury 
Pre-Cadbury 
compliance 
 Always  Never  Some 
  260  351  435 
Post-Cadbury 
compliance 
 Always Never Some  Always Never Some  Always Never Some 
  211 2 47  38 118 195  184 38 213 
    Once 
comply-
always 
comply 
Comply-  
then no 
comply 
   Once 
comply-
always 
comply 
Comply-  
then no 
comply 
   Once comply-
always 
comply 
Comply-  
then no 
comply 
    7 40    108 87    72 141 
Group  1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12 
No. of firms  211 2 7 40  38 118 108 87  184 38 72 141 
No. of 
observations 
 2,307 13 68 484  319 816 1,049 835  2,056 350 834 1,659 
Adopters?  No  No  No  No   Yes  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes  No  
 
This table analyses the sub-sample of 1,046 sample firms which have firm year observations both before and after the Cadbury Code in 30/06/1993. It firstly splits this 
subsample according to whether, before Cadbury (30/06/1993), the firm always has, never has, or sometimes has three non-executive directors. It secondly splits these 
sub samples according to whether after Cadbury the firm always has, never has, or sometimes has three non-executive directors. If the latter, a further classification is 
made according to whether, once the firm has three non-executive directors, it always maintains at least three non-executive directors or whether it then reverts to less 
than three. The sample of 1,046 firms can be split into 12 separate groups on these criteria. In the final row of the table, we classify the firms into two groups according 
to whether they are adopters (402 firms), or not (644 firms).  
 
 
 
Table 7. The impact of Cadbury on executive pay  
 (1)  
Adopters only 
(2)  
All firms 
(3)  
All firms 
Intercept 0.03 0.00 0.03 
 (0.40) -(0.16) (0.57) 
∆ Pay it-1 0.26 a 0.28 a 0.29 a 
 (9.00) (13.66) (14.09) 
∆ Size it 0.16 a 0.17 a 0.17 a 
 (11.66) (19.39) (19.63) 
∆ Return
 it 0.04 a 0.08 a 0.07 a 
 (2.57) (5.24) (5.38) 
∆ Standard deviation
 it -0.51 a -0.31 a -0.32 a 
 -(4.90) -(4.87) -(4.98) 
Adopters post-Cadbury
 it -0.01 -0.01 c  
 -(1.26) -(1.73)  
Adopters post-Cadbury
 it * ∆ Return it 0.04 c 0.06 b  
 (1.70) (2.52)  
Adopters i  0.01  
  (1.29)  
Adopters i * ∆ Return it  -0.02  
  -(1.22)  
Post-Cadbury it  0.04 0.03 
  (1.63) (1.40) 
Post-Cadbury it * ∆ Return it  -0.04 a -0.03 c 
  -(2.60) -(1.70) 
    
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sargan (p-value) 0.2242 0.1787 0.2267 
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.2741 0.2854 0.2502 
No. of observations  4,258 10,790 10,790 
 
This table reports regressions of executive pay on whether sample firms adopted the Cadbury recommendation 
of having at least three non-executive directors. The model is estimated using the Arrellano and Bond (1991) 
generalised method of moments procedure. This procedure uses first differences of the dependent and 
independent variables, and instruments the first difference of prior pay using levels of all variables dated it-2 and 
earlier. Post-Cadbury is a dummy variable set equal to one for all financial years after Cadbury (30/06/1993), 
zero for all years prior. Adopters is a dummy variable set equal to one for those firms classified as adopters in 
Table 6, zero otherwise. Adopters post-Cadbury is a dummy variable set equal to one for all years after which 
Adopters have adopted Cadbury, zero for all years prior to this. Other variables are as defined in Table 3 above. 
The sample employed in Column (1) is the 402 sample firms which have firm year observations both before and 
after the Cadbury Code (30/06/1993), and are identified as adopters in Table 6. The samples employed in 
Columns (2) and (3) are all the 1,046 sample firms for which we have firm year observations both before and 
after the Cadbury Code (30/06/1993). The Sargan statistic tests for over-identifying restrictions, and is 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The serial correlation statistic 
tests the absence of second-order correlation in the residuals, and is asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. P-values are provided in parentheses. a, b and c denote significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Notes 
1 Previous studies have attempted to overcome simultaneous endogeneity by employing 
instrumental variable techniques. However, such regressions require the identification of 
strictly exogenous instrumental variables which Wintoki (2007) argues is almost impossible 
in a corporate governance setting. 
2 The majority of empirical studies, reviewed by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), document a 
negative association between board size and firm performance. 
3 These include the requirements that all firms must have a majority of independent directors 
and that all board committees consist of independent directors only.  
4 Although the proportion of non-executives increased following Cadbury (Dahya et al., 
2002; and Guest, 2008), it is still relatively low and non-executive director independence is 
still weak due to an appointment process which is too informal (Higgs, 2003).  
5 However, there is evidence that firms which increase the number of non-executive directors 
following the Cadbury recommendations experience better monitoring in terms of CEO 
turnover (Dahya et al., 2002) and better overall performance (Dahya and McConnell, 2007). 
6 For more details on the establishment of the Cadbury Committee, see Dahya et al. (2002). 
7 Another key recommendation of Cadbury was that the CEO and Chairman should be 
separate directors. Conyon and Leech (1994), Conyon (1997), and Benito and Conyon (1999) 
find no evidence that the CEO-Chairman separation has a significant effect on executive pay.  
8 Although compliance with the Greenbury (1995) disclosure recommendation was initially 
on a comply or explain basis, in 2002 it was made a statutory requirement. 
9 Due to data availability on Datastream, we are only able to classify directors as executive or 
non-executive, and not in terms of finer classifications of independence. This approach is 
similar to most previous large sample studies for both the US and UK. 
10 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that pay is linked not just to firm but also to 
industry performance, which they refer to as ‘lucky’ pay, and that strong corporate 
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governance reduces this link. We examine this by including the average industry share return 
as well as the firm return. The results, not tabulated, show that the coefficient for the industry 
return is positive but statistically insignificant, whilst the firm return coefficient is still 
significantly positive. Therefore we find no evidence that UK executive pay is impacted by 
‘luck’. We further find no evidence that the link between pay and industry return is impacted 
by the proportion of non-executives or board size.   
11 For example, Guest (2008) shows that although Cadbury has a significant positive impact 
on the proportion of non-executives, adoption of the Cadbury recommendation to employ at 
least three non-executives is associated with many of the usual determinants of non-executive 
representation. 
